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JUDICIAL REVIEW
IN CANADA:
HOW MUCH DO WE NEED IT?*
Peter W. Hoggt

INTRODUCTION

F

or some years now in Canada a tide has been running strongly in
favour of increased judicial review of official decisions. It is seen
most clearly in the McRuer Report,' whose recommendations for increased judicial review were welcomed by the press and translated into
legislation by the Ontario legislature. 2 It is also evident in the new
Federal Court Act, 3 which increases the scope of judicial review of
federal agencies. The assumption is that judicial review is a good thing,
and that if we have more of it we shall be better off. There are two
propositions involved in this, and the second does not, as a matter of
logic, follow from the first. Only if we examine why judicial review is
a good thing will we be in a position to determine how much we need:
where the reason ends, there the rule should also end. I have just completed a study of all the administrative law cases decided in the Su*The articles relating to Judicial Review in Canada were delivered as part of the
Annual Lecture Series of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. The theme
of the Series was "The Individual and The Bureaucracy."
-Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Canada.
1J. C. McRuer, Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil Rights, Queen's Printer,

Toronto, 1968-1971, Vols. 1-5.
2Judicial Review Procedure Act, 1971, S.O. 1971, c. 48, is the statute defining the
procedure for and scope of review of the agencies.
3
Federal Court Act, S.C. 1970, c.1.
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preme Court of Canada from 1949 to the present, 4 and I shall draw on
the results of that study to develop the argument which follows.
There is nothing intrinsically good about judicial review-or indeed
any other kind of review. On the contrary, review always means that a
question decided once has to be decided again. Review is a duplication
of effort which involves extra expense and extra delay. 5 It is not worth
bearing these costs unless there is a strong likelihood of improvement
in the quality of decision. When is there a strong likelihood of improvement in the quality of decision? How do we measure the "quality"
of a decision anyway? It would be idle to expect definitive answers to
these questions, but a first step in seeking the answers must be to consider the Court's and the Agency's qualifications to decide.
THE AGENCY'S QUALIFICATIONS
Let us start with the Agency. There is a great variety of agencies
doing a great variety of tasks. The reason why the Legislature assigns a
particular task to a particular agency will usually be something of a
matter for speculation. And yet the assignment of decision-making
power in a regulated area to an agency (or official) will offer some or all
of the following advantages. First of all, specialization and expertise:
a body with relatively continuous experience with the regulated area
will acquire more knowledge and understanding of it than would be
possessed by a court. Secondly, innovation: if the regulatory scheme is
new or experimental, it may be desirable for an agency to be given a
broad area of discretion to develop new policies and remedies; a court
would normally be unsuited to this kind of policy innovation. Thirdly,

initiative: an agency may be given power to initiate proceedings, to
undertake its own investigations, to do research, and to feed information and recommendations back to the government or to other agencies;
a court traditionally plays a less active role: it relies on the parties to
initiate the process of adjudication and to adduce all relevant information, it is preoccupied with the disposition of the single case before it,
and it makes no systematic effort to synthesise its experience and make
it available to legislators or anyone else. Fourthly, caseload: if adjudication will be required frequently, the volume of cases may cast an unacceptable burden on the court system, requiring a specialised tribunal.
4p. W. Hogg, The Supreme Court of Canada and Administrative Law, 1949-

1971 (1973) 11 O.H.L.J. 187.
5See Albert S. Abel, Appeals against Administrative Decisions (1962) 5
ADMIN. 65, 65.

CAN. PUB.
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Fifthly, expense: adjudication by an agency is likely to be quicker, less
formal and therefore somewhat less expensive than adjudication by a
court.

6

These advantages of the Agency as a decision-maker suggest that the
scope of judicial review should be narrow. The Agency will be better
qualified than the Court to decide most questions coming before it. For
the general run of cases there is little likelihood that the Court will be
able to improve upon the Agency's decision. Therefore tile desirability
of bringing a controversy to a final conclusion should dictate that review be unavailable.
THE DECISION IN METROPOLITAN LIFE
As an illustration of a case where in my view judicial review was inappropriate, take Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. International
Union of Operating Engineers,7 a decision given in 1970 by the Supreme Court of Canada. The Ontario Labour Relations Board had
power to certify a union as the bargaining agent of the employees in a
bargaining unit where the Board was "satisfied that more than 55 percent of the employees in the bargaining unit are members of the trade
union." The Board, acting under this power, certified the International
Union of Operating Engineers as the bargaining agent for the maintenance workers in Metropolitan Life's Ottawa office. The Board acted
on the basis of uncontradicted evidence that more than 55 percent of
the employees had applied for membership of the union, had paid an
initiation fee, and had been accepted by the union as members. The
difficulty in the case was caused by the fact that the union's constitution
provided only for membership by operating engineers, and the employees in this bargaining unit were maintenance workers. The Supreme Court relied on this fact to quash the decision of the Board. The
Court reasoned that the Board -had no power of certification unless it
was satisfied that the maintenance workers were "members" of the
union. But a person such as a maintenance worker who did not fit the
eligibility requirements of the union constitution could not be a
"member." Therefore the Board had no power to certify the union, and
its decision was void.
Metropolitan Life is an illustration of what is sometimes called the
61 appreciate, of course, that agency proceedings are not always informal, quick
and cheap, and that court proceedings are not always formal, slow and expensive.
7[1970] S.C.R. 425. I have discussed this case in a previous article, The Jurisdictional Fact Doctrine in the Supreme Court of Canada (1971) 9 O.H.L.J. 203, 212.
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"jurisdictional fact doctrine." According to this doctrine, once a "fact"
found by an Agency has been classified by the Court as jurisdictional,
a wrong finding by the Agency makes its decision invalid, for the
Agency is then acting outside the powers conferred upon it. In this
case the existence of the requisite percentage of "members" was classified as jurisdictional. Therefore the Board's wrong determination that
maintenance workers could be "members" made its decision void. I
have criticized the jurisdictional fact doctrine elsewhere8 and I do not
propose to go over the same ground again. It suffices to say that there
is nothing inevitable about the doctrine. The statute requires the Board
to make a finding as to the existence of the requisite percentage of
members before it can exercise its powers. The only issue is whether the
Board's opinion should be treated as authoritative, or whether the
Court should treat its own opinion as the authoritative one.
If we consider the qualifications of the Board to decide the question,
it is clear that the Board's decision is likely to be the better one. The
Ontario legislature has established by statute a framework for collective
bargaining. The administration of the statute requires certain recurring
questions to be adjudicated. One of these is the certification of unions
as bargaining agents for groups of employees. This adjudicatory function, which could have been given to the ordinary courts, was instead
given to an administrative agency. That agency acquired a specialized
and expert knowledge of the questions of labour relations which regularly came before it. One such question was whether employees who
did not satisfy the eligibility requirements of a union constitution
could be treated as "members" of that union for certification purposes.
The Board had encountered this problem before and had evolved a
policy to meet it. It had decided to formulate and apply a uniform
criterion of membership for certification purposes: if the evidence indicated that an employee had applied for membership of the union
and had paid an initiation fee, and that the union would in fact accord
him all the rights and privileges of membership, then the Board's policy
was to treat that employee as a "member" of the union. In other words
the Board had deliberately decided not to accept the requirements of
the union constitution as controlling, but to apply its own uniform
rule. There seem to have been two main reasons for the Board's adoption of a uniform rule. One reason was a view held by the Board that
every employee who was claimed as a member by a union seeking certification should have made a financial sacrifice in addition to merely
8(1971) 9 O.H.L.J. 203, 209-217.
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signing an application card: if a union in its constitution were free to
abolish its initiation fee for the purpose of an organizational drive,
then its list of "members" might lack credibility, and the union might
have an unfair advantage over a competing union which did require
an initiation fee. A second reason for a uniform rule, and one which
is germane to this case, is that the unions for a number of reasons find
it difficult to keep the membership qualifications in their constitutions
up-to-date with new work patterns, new job classifications, and even
with their own organizational initiatives; to insist on amendment of
the union constitution so as to accord with its actual organizational
activity would involve serious delays in certification and therefore in
collective bargaining. These were the reasons which led the Labour
Board to develop the uniform standard of membership, which led it
to certify the union in Metropolitan Life. 9 No doubt there is room for
argument about the wisdom of the rule, but it is doubtful if anyone unversed in labour relations would have much to contribute to the argument. When the Court rushes in to substitute its legalistic solution for
the Board's pragmatic one, it is seriously disturbing the expectations
and practices of those regulated by the Labour Relations Act. The
Board's view is likely to be the better one; the less well-informed Court
should have deferred to it. t° In fact the Supreme Court's decision in
Metropolitan Life was immediately-and retrospectively-corrected by
the legislature." The total cost of review in Metropolitan Life was high
indeed.
THE COURT'S QUALIFICATIONS
Let us turn now from the Agency's special qualifications as a decisionmaker to the Court's special qualifications. One obvious qualification
of the Court is that its judges are lawyers. If one concentrates on this
qualification it is easy to conclude that the court should always have
the power to review questions of law which come before the Agency.
This is a theory which surfaces from time to time in the United States.
The trouble with it is the difficulty of identifying questions of "law."
It is a truism among administrative lawyers that "law," "fact" and
"policy" are inextricably bound up together in the process of decision9See O.L.R.B. Monthly Report, August 1967, 437, for the decision of the Board;
and see J. G. Norwood, Comment (1970) 28 U. of T. Fac. L.R. 109 for discussion.
10The commentary on the Supreme Court's decision in Metropolitan Life has generally been critical: (1970) 28 U. of T. Fac. L.R. 109 (Norwood); (1971) 9 O.H.L.J.
1, 30 (Weiler); (1971) 9 O.H.L.J. 203, 212 (Hogg); (1971) 49 Can. B.R. 365 (Lyon).
11S.0. 1970, c.3, ss.1, 2.
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making. A judicial power to review questions of law will leave few
agency decisions invulnerable to attack. In Canadian administrative
law at present there is no general judicial power to review questions of
law.12 The issue for the reviewing court is not whether an error of law
has been made, but whether the Agency has acted within its powers or
not. This leaves plenty of problems, as we shall see, but the fact-law
dichotomy is no improvement.' 3 Unfortunately, the new Federal Court
Act and the new Ontario Judicial Review Procedure Act have each
extended the judicial power to review for error of law,' 4 so that our
courts are going to be increasingly invited to review decisions which
they should leave weli alone.
By way of parenthesis it is perhaps worth adding that I certainly
would not accept the American doctrine that agency findings of fact
are reviewable to see if they are supported by "substantial evidence"
on the whole record.' 5 This formula allows the Court to examine and
weigh the evidence before the Agency. It permits a costly re-examination of all findings of fact, and by a Court which is not informed by
the same specialised knowledge and understanding as the Agency. The
analogy of review of a jury's findings, which is often made by American
judges and writers, 16 seems to me to be inapt, because administrative
agencies are rarely ad hoc amateur bodies comparable to a jury. I am
therefore sorry that the new Federal Court of Appeal has been given
power to review findings of fact in language which bears a close resemblance to the American substantial evidence rule,' 7 and that there
12The present relevance to Canadian law of the distinction between "law"' and
"fact" is this. Certiorari will lie for error within jurisdiction if the error appears on
the face of the record and is one of "law." In Ontario this anomalous ground of
review has been extended to the "application for judicial review": The Judicial
Review Procedure Act, 1971, S.O. 1971, c.48, s.2(2). Statutory appeals are occasionally
granted from an agency to the courts for error of "law." The new Federal Court of
Appeal has been given power to review for error of "law": Federal Court Act, S.C.
1970, c.1,
s.28.
13H. W. R. Wade, Anglo-American Administrative Law: More Reflections (1966)
82 L.Q.R. 226, argues that the U.S. law is an improvement over the English law.
He argues that the "substantial evidence" rule for questions of fact, and the
"rational basis" rule for questions of law are so similar that it is unnecessary for the
U.S. courts to characterize questions as being "fact" or "law." But, as he admits,
the courts still often assert a power of full review of findings of law, even if there
is a "rational basis" for the agency's finding. The rational basis test is not firmly
established, and Jaffe for one rejects it: Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (1965), 576 and see note 35, infra.
14 See note 12, supra.
15JAFFE, ch. 15; KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TIREATISE (1958), ch. 29.
16See JAFFE, 616.

17Federal Court Act, S.C. 1970, c.], s.28(l) (c): power to review decision based on
"an erroneous finding of fact that it made in a perverse or capricious manner or
without regard for the material before it."
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is a provision in the new Ontario Judicial Review Procedure Act
which 'could develop into a similar power.18
Albert S. Abel makes an appealing argument. He would not support
full review of all questions of law coming before an agency. He agrees
that the Court should leave to the Agency decisions which turn on
technical terms or which concern matters of policy. But he reasons
from the premise that judges are lawyers to the conclusion that the
task of interpreting statutory language should rest finally with the
courts "where the statutory terms by themselves or in their context are
standard legal terms common to many acts or where they are everyday
popular terms with no colour of special usage.''19
My difficulty with this formulation is that it seems to allow the Court
to be the sole judge of when statutory language is a "standard legal
term" or an "everyday popular term." The meaning of statutory language (or any language for that matter) always depends upon its context. It will be rare indeed to find a term in a statute which does not
draw some colour from the purposes and policies of the statute of
which it is a part. Judges who are not familiar with the purposes and
policies of the statute, and with the expectations of those familiar with
the field of regulation, may give to a term its "standard legal meaning"
or its "everyday popular meaning" in ignorance of the technical or
policy implications of their decision. The field of labour law is replete
with examples of judges assigning meaning to what they believed were
just everyday or standard legal terms, and thereby disturbing the longstanding and rational expectations of those working in the field. 20
Metropolitan Life is a good example. The misleading term "jurisdictional fact" 21 should not conceal that what was in issue in that case
was the meaning of the statutory phrase "members of the trade union."
This looks like a phrase which a lawyer is eminently well-qualified to
define by the application of ordinary legal techniques. Yet, if we are to
judge by the speedy legislative reaction, and the critical commentary,
the lawyer's solution turned out to be inappropriate to what was essentially a problem of labour relations policy. The same kind of point
may be made about other cases where the court has used the so-called
jurisdictional fact doctrine as the basis for judicial review. 22 The ques18S.O. 1971, c.48, s.2(3).
19(1962) 5 CAN. PUB. ADMIN. 65, 74.

20There has been a great deal of criticism of the role of the courts in reviewing
the decisions of labour relations boards. The most recent article is P. C. Weiler,
The "Slippery Slope" of Judicial Intervention (1971) 9 O.H.L.J. 1. 1 am much in-

debted to this excellent study.
21For criticism of the term, see Hogg (1971) 9 O.H.L.J. 203, 215.
There are occasional cases which may be capable of analysis in Abel's terms,

22
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tion whether Barbara Jarvis is a "person" looks dead easy-until it is
seen to be a question about the scope and policy of labour relations
regulation. 23 The question whether Kenneth Bell's flat is a "selfcontained dwelling unit" looks like the meat and drink of any competent lawyer-until it is seen as depending upon the purposes and
policies of an anti-discrimination law. 24 It is no part of my thesis that

the Court is incapable of giving sensible answers to these questions. If
there were no Agency the Court would have to give the answers. But
when there is an Agency it seems only realistic to recognize that the
questions have a component of technicality and policy which lies beneath their surface, and which the Agency is better equipped than the
Court to identify, to evaluate, and to feed into its decision.
GENERAL VALUES
Is there then any room whatsoever for judicial review? My answer is
yes, and it stems from the premise that the judges are not merely lawyers but generalists. There are dangers in allowing a specialist agency
to operate completely free from review. The very qualities which make
the Agency well suited to determine questions within its area of specialization may lead it to overlook or underestimate general values
which are fundamental to the legal order as a whole. The generalist
Court is ideally suited to check the specialist Agency at the point where
these general values are threatened.
First and foremost among these general values are those which are
associated with the Canadian commitment to a democracy based on the
English parliamentary system. The most obvious feature of a democracy is that the laws are made by legislatures whose members are
elected. If officials were free to act outside the authority of those laws,
the democratic principle would be subverted. The principle that official action must be authorized by law in order to be valid is perhaps
the kernel of Dicey's much criticized "rule of law." Regarded simply as
a requirement of validity it is no special cause for pride, for no civilized community would accept as valid whatever was done by an official,
e.g., The Queen v. Leong Ba Chai [1954] S.C.R. 10; see also

JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL

631.
23
Jarvis
v.
Associated
Medical
Services
Inc. [1964] S.C.R. 497.
24

OF ADMINISTRATIVE

ACTION (1965),

Bell v. Ontario Human Rights Commission [1971] S.C.R. 756; see also Toronto
Newspaper Guild v. Globe Printing Co. [1953] 2 S.C.R. 18; Labour Relations
Board (B.C.) v. Canada Safeway Ltd. [1953] 2 S.C.R. 46; Commission des Relations
Ouvrieres de Quebec v. Burlington Mills Hosiery Co. of Canada Ltd. [1964] S.C.R.
342; Jarvis v. Associated Medical Services Inc. [1964] S.C.R. 497; Galloway Lumber
Co. Ltd. v. Labour Relations Board (B.C.) [1965] S.C.R. 222.
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or whatever bore the trappings of an official act. In a democratic country the principle of validity has special significance, since the laws
which must authorize official action must be made by a freely elected
legislature. Every exercise of official power must therefore have a democratic root. In countries which have inherited the English common law
it has fallen to the Court to apply the principle of validity, and thereby
insist upon the democratic character of the government.
The role of the Court as a "guarantor of the integrity of the legal
system" 25 may be illustrated by a well-known trilogy of damages actions
brought by Jehovah's Witnesses in Quebec during the 1950's. In
Chaput v. Romain26 police had broken up an assembly of Jehovah's
Witnesses who were meeting peacefully in a private house. In Lamb v.
Benoit2 7 police had arrested a Jehovah's Witness who was distributing
pamphlets on a street corner, held her in custody for a weekend, and
then laid charges which proved to be without foundation. In Roncarelli v. Duplessis2 8 the Premier of Quebec had ordered the cancellation of restaurateur Roncarelli's liquor licence because Roncarelli was
a Jehovah's Witness who had made a practice of acting as bondsman
for the numerous Jehovah's Witnesses who were arrested for distributing their literature in breach of municipal by-laws. In each case the
Supreme Court of Canada held that the official decision complained of
was made without any legal authority whatsoever, and the Court
awarded damages against the defendant officials. The officials were not
allowed to shelter behind the trappings of their office, because their
decisions did not satisfy the principle of validity: they were not authorized by any statute.
It is clear to me that Canadians could not accept a legal system in
which there was no avenue of redress for Roncarelli and his fellow
Witnesses. Furthermore, it is not easy to see how any tribunal other
than the ordinary courts would be as well equipped to adjudicate disputes of this kind between the individual and the State or its officials.
The ordinary courts offer as good an assurance of neutrality as is
reasonable to expect in an imperfect world. The judges are still human,
of course,29 but they are immeasurably strengthened by their high
25JAFFE, 589.

26[1955] S.C.R. 834.
27[1959] S.C.R. 321.
28[1959] S.C.R. 121.
29

1n each of the three cases the official decision was upheld in the highest Quebec
court; and in two of the three cases the Supreme Court of Canada was divided, with
the French-Canadian members in dissent. In Lamb v. Benoit [1959] S.C.R. 321
Taschereau, Fauteux and Abbott JJ. dissented on the basis that the action had been
brought outside a six-month limitation period. In Roncarelli v. Duplessis [195 91
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standing in the community, their security of tenure and their long tradition of independence.
The experience of France shows that the ordinary courts could be
replaced by a specialist tribunal for the purpose of deciding controversies between the citizen and the State, but the French Conseil d'Etat
has evolved slowly over a period of more than a century and a half. An
attempt to establish it in one stroke in a country with quite different
constitutional arrangements and traditions would be likely to fail. The
risk is that a more specialized tribunal would lack the detachment from
the administrative process which in my judgment is appropriate to
judicial review. On the one hand, it might acquire so much sympathy
for the administrative point of view as to lose sight of competing
democratic or civil libertarian values. On the other hand, it might
acquire so much confidence in its own expertise as to lose sight of the
legitimate official claims to autonomy and finality. The kind of limited
review which can appropriately be provided by a generalist court is, to
my mind, exactly what is required.
Kenneth Culp Davis tells us that judicial review should depend upon
the "comparative qualifications" of Court and Agency. 30 And Albert S.
Abel tells us that "the fittest should finally decide."'" This approach to
judicial review throws a lot of light in dark places, as I hope my earlier
discussion of the jurisdictional fact doctrine has shown. But it is incomplete. If the Agency decides a matter which has not been assigned
to it for decision, then the Court should strike down the purported
decision. One may describe this as an application of the principle of
validity, or of legislative supremacy, or of the "rule of law"; but however described it is basic to our constitutional arrangements and will
not and should not change. It is not enough to say that the Agency was
well qualified to make the decision, it must also be legally authorized
to make the decision.
INTERPRETING THE EMPOWERING STATUTE
The three Jehovah's Witnesses cases were easy in the sense that the
defendants were unable to point to any statute which authorized their
S.C.R. 121 Taschereau and Fauteux JJ. again dissented on the similar ground that
a statutory notice had not been given to the defendant one month before the issue

of the writ; Cartwright J. also dissented, but on a different point. Chaput v.
Romain [1955] S.C.R. 834 was a unanimous decision in which Taschereau and
Fauteux JJ. participated; there were similar privative provisions there too, but they
were held unavailing.
30DAVIS, vol. 4, s.28.21.

31Abel, (1962) 5 CAN. PuB. ADMIN. 65, 73.
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actions. In most cases, however, the official is able to point to a statute
which gives him power to do some things, and the question is whether
the statute gives him power to do the very thing which is complained of.
How is the Court to handle these cases, where there is a genuine question of statutory interpretation as to whether the Agency was authorized to do what it did? The principle of validity (or legislative supremacy or rule of law) seems to insist that the Court should interpret the
empowering statute to decide whether or not the Agency has acted
within its legislative mandate. But the principle of comparative qualifications, which led me to condemn the decision in Metropolitan Life,
seems to insist that the Court should accept the Agency's interpretation
of its own legislative mandate. After all, has it not been demonstrated
that the Agency will be better informed than the Court as to the purposes and policies of its own statute?
Obviously a compromise has to be worked out between the competing claims of the principle of validity and the principle of comparative qualifications. So far as possible we want the ultimate decision to
be both valid and well-informed. And-to introduce a new element into
the argument-we also want the ultimate decision to reflect civil libertarian values which are basic to our legal order. Is there any way in
which this can be accomplished? Again, I believe that the answer is yes,
and I shall try and demonstrate with examples of the kind of cases in
which I believe judicial review is appropriate.
The first example is Beatty v. Kozak, 32 decided in the Supreme Court
of Canada in 1958. Saskatchewan's Mental Hygiene Act included a
power to arrest a person "apparently mentally ill," where the person
was "conducting himself in a manner which in a normal person would
be disorderly." The plaintiff in Beatty v. Kozak was arrested while
working peacefully in her office, and was then detained for 44 days. She
sued the policeman and police matron who had made the arrest for
damages for false imprisonment. The majority of the Supreme Court
of Canada held that the plaintiff was entitled to damages. Since she
was not, at the time of her arrest, "conducting [herself] in a manner
which in a normal person would be disorderly," it followed that the
statutory power of arrest had not arisen. Therefore the decision to
arrest her was unauthorized by the statute and was invalid.
The decision in Beatty v. Kozak, as I have described it, may appear
to be inevitable. That it was not so is made clear by Rand J's dissent.
He did not content himself with a literal reading of the statutory language. He pointed out that the language did not have to be read as
32[19581 S.C.R. 177.
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confined to disorderly conduct at the time of the arrest, but could be
read as extending to "past persistent disorderly conduct." 3 Rand J.
did not go so far as to decide that he agreed with that interpretation.
What he did decide was that he would defer to the official view. In
essence Rand J's holding is this: when a statutory provision will reasonably bear the meaning which its administrator has placed upon it, then
the Court should not substitute a different meaning.34
To ask, as Rand J. did, whether a statutory power will reasonably
bear the meaning which its administrator placed upon it is very different from seeking the one and only "correct" meaning of the statute.
In the United States some courts and writers have asserted a similar
doctrine of restraint by the Court: an Agency finding should be respected if it has a "reasonable" or a "rational" basis in law.3i The test
of "reasonableness," as opposed to "correctness," does offer a good likelihood of a decision which is informed by agency expertise, and which
is nevertheless responsive to democratic and civil libertarian values. It
forces the Court to treat the Agency as a partner-albeit the junior
partner-in interpreting the scope of the Agency's powers. But it still
leaves the Court with the power to check the Agency if its use of power
cannot be sustained on a reasonable interpretation of the statute. What
is reasonable has to be decided by the Court. It should depend to some
extent upon the nature of the power. In Beatty v. Kozak the power had
enabled the defendants to imprison the plaintiff for 44 days. In interpreting a statute which confers a power of this order, it is necessary to
weigh the official claim to effective government against the individual's
claim to personal liberty. The danger is that the Agency, if unchecked
by the Court, may place too great an emphasis on its perception of the
needs of government and too little on the competing claim to personal
liberty. And yet our legal order places a high value on the claim to
personal liberty. It is for the generalist Court to see to it that this
value is not overwhelmed by a distorted interpretation of governmental
power. The Court is justified in insisting that invasions of fundamental
civil liberties should be authorized by relatively clear language. The
331d., 187 (my italics).

4Md.
See DAVIS, vol. 4, s.30.05. This is not universally accepted doctrine in the
U.S.A., however: see id., ss.30.06, 30.07; and note 13, supra. Jaffe argues for a "clear
statutory purpose" test, which accords a much stronger role to the Court: "where
the judges are themselves convinced that a certain reading, or application, of the
statute is the correct-or the only faithful-reading or application, they should
intervene and so declare": JAFFE, 572. In his view a "competent and responsible
judiciary" should assert its view of the statute, even where the agency's construction
35

is a "sensible" one: Id., 576.
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range of reasonable interpretations is limited by the competing civil
libertarian values. In Beatty v. Kozak it seems to me that Rand J.
uncharacteristically gave insufficient weight to these values. The police
interpretation of the power was certainly not absurd, but it did strain
the statutory language. I believe that, taking all considerations into
account, it was outside the "reasonable" range. (It may be possible to
support Rand J.'s view on the footing that there was a privative clause
in the statute; the privative clause would certainly justify greater judicial restraint.)
In Beatty v. Kozak the Court had to decide when the police power
arose, and it did so by interpreting the empowering statute. This is a
common kind of issue to arise before the Court. An official decision is
rendered, and the question is whether the statute authorizes that kind
of decision. The Governor in Council expropriates wheat to prevent
profiteering from the end of price control.3 6 The municipality of Metropolitan Toronto enacts a by-law providing for the fluoridation of drinking water to diminish tooth decay.17 The Ontario Racing Commission
orders an owner to rename horses whose names are "in bad taste." 38
The Department of National Revenue orders a bank to produce the
records of its dealings with a customer whose taxation liability is under
investigation. 39 The Board of Transport Commissioners orders Bell
Telephone to supply service in an area served by another telephone
company. 40 The Department of Immigration grants a period of "probation" to an illegal immigrant. 41 The Department of Transport as pilotage authority classifies pilots into grades with different salaries and responsibilities. 42 The Canadian Radio-Television Commission instead
of revoking a radio broadcasting licence renews it for a terminal period. 43 Each of these cases (and there are many others) was essentially
similar to Beatty v. Kozak. A decision was made by an official or agency
acting in good faith in what he believed was the due execution of his
powers. In each case the Court had to decide whether the empowering
statute authorized the decision. In each case the result depended upon
36

Canadian Wheat Board v. Nolan [1951] S.C.R. 81; revd. sub. nom. A.-G. Can. v.

Hallet & Carey Ltd. [1952] A.C. 427 (P.C.). (Case had commenced before the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council.)
37
Metropolitan Toronto v. Village of Forest Hill [1957] S.C.R. 569.
38
Wm. F. Morrissey Ltd. v. Ontario Racing Commission [1960] S.C.R. 104.
9
3 Canadian Bank of Commerce v. A.-G. Can. [1962] S.C.R. 729.
4
°Metcalfe Telephones Ltd. v. McKenna [1964] S.C.R. 202.
41Violi v. Superintendent of Immigration [1965] S.C.R. 232.
42

Jones and Maheux v. Gamache [19691 S.C.R. 119.
Confederation Broadcasting (Ottawa) Ltd. v. Canadian Radio-Television Commission [1971] S.C.R. 906.
43
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whether the Court was willing to give the statute a broad construction
in support of the official interest, or whether the court chose a narrow
construction in support of the individual interest. My study of the
cases in the Supreme Court between 1949 and 197144 discloses no clear

pattern of result, which is to be expected, bearing in mind the great
variety in the cases. On the whole however the tendency is in favour
of the administrative construction. The Court rarely articulates any
policy of deference to a reasonable administrative interpretation, but
its practice does generally accord with that policy.
ABUSE OF DISCRETION
Is there any scope for judicial review where the Agency has made a
decision which falls literally within the language of the empowering
statute? If we incorporate the "reasonableness" test into this question,
the question becomes whether it is ever unreasonable for the Agency
to rely on the literal language of the empowering statute. Usually of
course the answer is no. But not always. The case of Smith and Rhuland
v. The Queen45 is one of the exceptions. In that case the Nova Scotia
Labour Relations Board refused certification to a union on the ground
that the union was dominated by an official who was a Communist.
46
The Supreme Court of Canada, by a majority, quashed the decision.
Rand J.'s majority opinion agreed that the empowering statute gave
to the Board a discretionary power not to certify a union even when
the union enjoyed the support of a sufficient number of employees in
the bargaining unit. But that discretion was not unfettered. It was not
open to the Board to "act upon the view that official association with
an individual holding political views considered to be dangerous by the
Board proscribes a labour organization. ' 47 An exercise of discretion
based on that ground was outside the empowering statute and invalid.
Can this result be accommodated within a theory of judicial review
which insists upon restraint on the part of the Court? More specifically,
why is this case different from Metropolitan Life, which I attacked
earlier?48 In both cases a Labour Board made a considered determina44(1973) 11 O.H.L.J. 187.
45[1953] 2 S.C.R. 95.

46Rand J.'s opinion, discussed in the text, was concurred in by Kerwin and Estey
JJ. Kellock J. concurred in the result, but on the ground that the Board had no
discretion not to certify a union which satisfied the conditions of certification.
Taschereau, Cartwright and Fauteux JJ. dissented on the ground that the Board

had exercised its statutory discretion, and the Court should not intervene.
47[1953] 2 S.C.R. 95, 100.

4SSee text accompanying note 7, supra.
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tion of an issue having elements of fact and law, and having a strong
labour relations policy component. If the Court was wrong to intervene in Metropolitan Life, can it have been right in Smith and Rhuland? I believe that the answer is yes. In Smith and Rhuland the
Board's policy was in violation of freedom of association, a general
value of the highest importance to the Canadian democratic legal
order. This value had to be weighed in the balance with the Agency's
perception of a desirable labour relations policy. In rejecting that
policy the Court was insisting that such a serious invasion of democratic and civil libertarian values be clearly authorized by the empowering statute. 49 The generalist Court was reminding the specialist
Agency that the Agency was not "an island entire of itself," and that
its work had to be brought "into harmony with the totality of the
law."50
The doctrine which was applied in Smith and Rhuland is the familiar one that statutory discretions must not be exercised in bad faith,
or for an improper purpose, or upon irrelevant considerations. Bad
faith, in the sense of dishonesty or corruption or the deliberate use of
power to accomplish a private end, is virtually non-existent, at least in
the cases which come before the Supreme Court of Canada. The problems concern the proper definition of "improper purpose" or "irrelevant considerations." In theory the answer is simple: these are purposes
or considerations which lie outside the scope of the empowering statute.
In practice, however, there is usually room for disagreement as to
whether a given purpose or consideration is or is not within the scope
of the empowering statute. Here, as elsewhere, the Agency should be
given the benefit of any reasonable doubt. I have explained why I
think Smith and Rhuland was rightly decided. The majority of cases
in which an exercise of discretion is attacked are more like Metropolitan Life: the Agency's perception of its role is a reasonable inference from the empowering statute, and therefore the Court should
defer to it. My study of the Supreme Court decisions 51 shows that,
while the results are not uniform, on the whole, the Court has chosen
the path of deference.
NATURAL JUSTICE
Another class of case where the Court will review a decision which
falls literally within the language of the empowering statute is the
49See especially [1953] 2 S.C.R. 95, 98 per Rand J.
50JAFFE, 590.
51(1973) 11 O.H.L.J. 187, 206-211.
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case where the Agency has reached its decision by an unfair procedure.
A Board of Health with power to evict the occupants of a dwelling on
grounds related to health issues an eviction order without disclosing
the grounds to the occupants and without giving them an opportunity
to be heard. 52 A Labour Relations Board with power to revoke a
union's certificate of representation "for cause" revokes the certificate
of a teachers' union without giving the union an opportunity to be
heard. 53 An immigration officer with power to deport certain aliens
makes a deportation order against a man and his wife without giving
to the wife a separate opportunity to establish that she should not be
included in the order."
It is not necessary to multiply examples. It is trite law that the Court
will require an adjudicatory agency with power to affect "the rights of
subjects" to observe the rules of natural justice. The Court's reasoning
is that, even if the empowering statute is silent as to the procedure
which its Agency must follow, yet the Legislature could not have intended the Agency to exercise its powers in breach of fundamental
principles of justice. And so, as was said in 1863, "the justice of the
common law will supply the omission of the legislature." 55 In short, the
Court interprets the statute as impliedly requiring that the rules of
natural justice be complied with.
This interpretation is not available, of course, where the Legislature
has made clear that the Agency need not afford any hearing, or need
not be unbiased. 56 But the Court insists that the statute should be
clear on the point. Is this an unwarranted intrusion by the Court? I
think not. An Agency with power to determine questions affecting
property rights or personal liberties obviously has to decide how to
ascertain the information upon which its decisions will be based. In
many cases the values of efficiency and fairness will not conflict. Both
will dictate that the person affected should give his version of the facts
before a final decision is made. But there is always a danger-amply
substantiated by the decided cases-that the Agency will make its decision without affording an adequate hearing to the person affected.
The Agency may decide that this would cause too much delay, or that
52Board of Health (Saltfleet Township) v. Knapman [1956] S.C.R. 877.

53Alliance des Professeurs Catholiques de Montreal v. Labour Relations Board of
Quebec [1953] 2 S.C.R. 140.
54Moshos v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration [19691 S.C.R. 886.
55 Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works (1863), 14 C.B.N.S. 180, 194; 143 E.R.
414, 420 per Byles J.
56This may no longer be true in the case of federal statutes because of the
Canadian Bill of Rights, s.2(e).
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it would be a waste of time, or it may simply be insensitive to the
anxieties of the persons subject to its jurisdiction. Now it is clear that
the Court should here, as elsewhere, defer to a reasonable Agency
judgment as to the Agency's own procedures. To insist upon courtroom rules of procedure and evidence would defeat some of the reasons
for establishing the Agency in the first place. But at the point where
the Agency's procedure ceases to be merely informal and becomes unfair, judicial intervention is justified. At that point the Agency's decision comes into collision with a general value, the value of procedural
fairness, which runs throughout the legal order, and judicial intervention is justified.
It must be remembered too that the courts themselves have developed
a considerable expertise in matters of procedure. Centuries of concern
about their own procedures, and about those of the agencies which the
prerogative writs have brought before them, have taught that there are
principles of procedural fairness which apply to a large number of
otherwise different institutions, which are therefore capable of generalised statement, and which only the courts have the breadth of experience to formulate. It is true that the courts have not been conspicuously successful in laying down workable rules as to when the
rules of natural justice are applicable, and as to what precisely they
entail. But some of the criticism of the courts stems from an irrational
hostility to any legal concept which cannot be neatly cut and dried; we
manage perfectly well with many concepts which are incapable of precise definition, for example, that of negligence. 57 The courts would be
unwise to elaborate unduly the rules of natural justice, because of the
great variety of agencies to which the rules must be applied. This is not
to say that the rules are as clear as they could be. The Supreme Court
of Canada, in particular, has thoroughly confused me (at least) by its
poorly reasoned holdings. But it is one thing to criticize the craftsmanship of the Court, as I have done elsewhere, 58 it is quite another to
deny that the Court should concern itself with procedural justice in the
agencies. I believe firmly that it should do so.59

57See Ridge v. Baldwin [1964] A.C. 40, 64-65 per Lord Reid.
58(1973) 11 O.H.L.J. 187, 214-221.
59My comments are, of course, addressed to the case where there is no statutory
code of procedure. The establishment in Ontario (The Statutory Powers Procedure
Act, 1971, S.O. 1971, c.47) of such a code, with a committee to tailor the code to each
particular agency, is an innovation which will obviously leave little scope for application of the rules of natural justice. For criticism, see J. Willis, The McRuer
Report: Lawyers' Values and Civil Servants' Values (1968) 18 U.T.L.J. 351.
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PRIVATIVE CLAUSES
Time does not permit an extensive discussion of privative clauses,
in which term I include all statutory provisions designed to oust judicial review: finality clauses, no-certiorari clauses, as-if-enacted clauses,
and also clauses imposing prior notice requirements or short limitation
periods. The Court's refusal to give effect to privative clauses is notorious: it clearly flies in the face of the legislative intent.60 And yet to
interpret such clauses literally, as Bora Laskin urged in his well-known
1952 article,6 i seems to me to fly in the face of countervailing civil
libertarian values. It must be remembered that the literal reading of
privative clauses would have defeated the plantiffs in each of the
three Jehovah's Witnesses cases, which I regard as flagrant abuses of
official power. 62 I find it hard to accept that the Legislature in enacting
a privative clause intends to exclude all judicial review, no matter how
far the Agency appears to exceed its powers, and no matter how severely
it invades personal or proprietary rights. I have argued elsewhere3 for
a compromise between the current judicial approach and the Laskin
approach. The compromise, which has been worked out in some of the
opinions of Rand, Judson and Abbott JJ. in the Supreme Court of
Canada, and which has become the prevailing doctrine in the High
Court of Australia, is to interpret the clause as requiring even more
restraint than usual on the part of the Court. The Agency's decision
must stand so long as it is a bona fide attempt to exercise the Agency's
power and is reasonably capable of reference to the power. This formulation should protect most decisions, while leaving the door ajar to
review in the rare extreme case.
CONCLUSIONS
Now let me summarize the conclusions.
1. In deciding matters which have to be decided in order to reach a
decision, the Agency's findings should normally be treated as conclusive. The costs of judicial review are not justified by the likelihood of
a better decision. This is so even where the error alleged may be classi6OSee articles in (1952) 30 CAN. B.R. 69 (Sutherland); (1952) 30 CAN. B.R. 986
(Laskin); (1965) 23 U. of T. FAc. L.R. 5 (Pink); (1967) U.B.C.L.R.-C. de D. 219
(Carter); (1969) 34 SASK. L.R. 334 (Norman).
61B. Laskin, Certiorari to Labour Boards: The Apparent Futility of Privative
Clauses (1952) 30 CAN. B.R. 986.
62See text accompanying notes 26 to 28, supra.
63(1973) 11 O.H.L.J. 187, 196-204.
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fled as one of "law", because a ruling of "law" tends to be a compound
of law, fact, and policy which lies peculiarly within the expertise of
the Agency.
2. Where, however, the Agency's decision is in conflict with a value
which is fundamental to the legal order as a whole, then the generalist
Court is under a duty to consider whether the administrative decision
should prevail over the more fundamental value. The administrative
decision which is completely unauthorized by statute must never be
permitted to prevail, for that would subvert the democratic legal order.
The administrative decision which bears some relationship to a statutory power should be permitted to prevail so long as it is a reasonable
interpretation of the power. The Court must decide whether the interpretation is reasonable. In order to decide this, the Court should inform itself as to the reasons for the administrative assumption of authority, and it should balance those reasons against the civil libertarian
or proprietary values which are asserted by the individual affected.
3. Where the Agency's decision is authorized by a literal reading of
general language in a statute, the Court still retains a power of review;
the Court may in effect cut down the generality of the language to
protect fundamental civil libertarian values. Cases such as Smith and
Rhuland, the natural justice cases, and some of the privative clause
cases are not unfaithful to the command of the legislature, for it is a
reasonable inference that a generally-worded provision, whose application to the ordinary case is clear, is not designed to cover the extraordinary case. In effect the Legislature is assumed not to have disturbed
values which are basic to our legal order, unless it does so relatively

clearly and specifically.
4. There is no institution in our community better equipped than
the Court to check the Agency at the point where its action is out of

harmony with the legal order as a whole. Judicial review is rarely
needed, but when it is needed nothing else will do. 64
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